GULA, Richard M.

Reason Informed by Faith, Foundations ofCatholic Morality

Paulist Press, 1989.

1. General.

This well-written and skilfully presentedbook can give the uncritical reader the impression of an objective and reasonedstudy; one which shows how the progress marked by major trends in current moralthinking is in an essential line of continuity with the best of our Catholicpast (especially St. Thomas). The book, however, does not stand up to anyrigorous analysis, especially in the light of what is implied in its title.

The title is quite misleading. In theauthor's analysis of Catholic morality, Faith is not the norm, principle orguide, which "informs" Reason. It is Experience, not Reason, that isreally offered as the governing principle for the development of moraltheology. "Morality Informed by Experience", would be a more accuratetitle.

While the tone is of one who wishes topresent a fair and balanced "overview of the present state of thediscipline" of moral theology, in practice the morality offered issubjective, individualist, experiential and proportionalist.

The author writes with great self-assurance,especially in claiming (or taking for granted) that the progressive school oftheology he embraces is much more strictly rational than what went before, orto the present alternatives (cfr. 47; 136; 154ss; 210-211; 224-225; 235-236,etc.). Yet his own "experiential" approach is to the detriment ofrationality.

2. Confusion of terminology.

His book can confuse the average reader allthe more because of the way he uses terms. He claims that his approach ispersonalist and community-based (when it rather is individualist); is consonantwith the natural law (which he voids by holding human nature to be in constantevolution); is not relativistic or subjectivistic — see, e.g. pp. 293-294 —(when, throughout, he denies any universally valid norms, and leaves each onebasically on his or her own in coming to moral judgments). For his ultimatesubjectivism, see also 305-306.

3. The "rationality" ofautonomous ethics.

He presentes "autonomous ethics"(with main exponents being Joseph Fuchs, Bruno Schuller, Charles Curran,Richard McCormick), as a reaction against making moral theology excessivelydependent on faith, and a movement towards grounding it more on natural law.This runs througout the book. The "new" morality is not only more"personalistic" and "experiential", but also more based onreason; and therefore in the true tradition of e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas. Theimpression is created that the autonomous ethics theologians base theirpositions on deeply reasoned arguments (which is precisely what one so oftenfinds lacking in them), whereas the traditionalists — as also represented inmost magisterial documents — simply appeal to faith, and not to reason, tojustify an outdated position. This he dismisses as the "faith-ethics"position, represented in particular by Joseph Ratzinger and Philip Delhaye(48).

He repeatedly gives the impression that themajor positions he sustains find support in St. Thomas Aquinas (on Natural Law— 223ss; on rationalism v. voluntarism — pp. 256ss; on the difference betweenformal and material norms — 292ss; on proportionalism (a "form ofteleology": 303), where he presents Fuchs, Janssens, R. McCormick andBruno Schuller as users, like Thomas, of the teleological method, in oppositionto the deontoligical method (301-302ss).

The pre-conciliar approach to law in theChurch was voluntaristic; we have now passed over to a more rationalisticapproach, more in keeping with the true spirit of justice as presented by St.Thomas (Ch. 17).

In the chapter "Natural LawToday", he seeks to apply the distinction "order of nature"/"order of reason" to magisterial documents. Casti connubii, HumanaeVitae, the Declaration on Certain Questions concerning Sexual Ethics, are allexamples of the approach "making the order of nature superior to the orderof reason in sexual matters" (232).

All of this can blind the unthinking readerto the fact that it is reason itself which teaches what is the right and wronguse of the sexual faculty. His accusation is that the traditional physicalistview allowed biological structures, and not true personalist values, todetermine sexual morality (231ss; cf. 63-64). Though he claims to identify hispersonalism with the order of reason, his position makes any rational analysisof human sexuality — body and spirit — impossible.

4. "Experiential wisdom".

Reason, for him, "includes observationand research, intuition, affection, common sense, and an aestheticsense..." (224). Note, for instance, his phrase: "We are notsubjected in a fated way to the inner finality of nature. We discover whatnatural law requires by reason reflecting on what is given in human experienceto lead to authentic human life..." (228). Her the three words,"natural law", "requires" and "reason", have clearlyall been emptied of significance, the operative word being"experience". So one understands the basic principle he has laiddown: "The proximate norm of morality is authentic human existence"(224). Cf. p. 235: "The work of reason is to discover moral value in theexperience of the reality of being human". On p.239, he presents the"Source of Moral norms", within the order of reason, as "HumanExperience"... (cf. p. 73; McCormick, p.275). "moral norms arederived from the experience of value"; "they express experientialwisdom" (284).

So it is not in reason or in Revelation,but basically in "experience" (which at times he qualifies as"community experience"), that moral norms find their rationale andsource. "Because moral norms take seriously the repetitive aspects ofhuman experience, they provide a reliable point of reference and direction formoral living" (284). Yet, in the end, the view he offers of such norms iswholly subjectivist (e.g. 285).

He speaks on p. 295 of the dangers of a"creeping legalism", in the traditional concept of moral absolutes.He seems oblivious of the "creeping subjectivism" of the approach heproposes which makes it useless as a guide to moral thinking, formation,orcounselling. In fact the thrust of the approach of the book (by a Seminaryprofessor) is that the pastoral function of the moralist is "not so muchproviding answers to moral questions as encouraging the process of arriving ata moral decision" (136).

He claims to show that the Encyclicals,etc. on the Church's social teaching are examples of ethical teaching whichuses the "order of reason approach to natural law"; and so they showgreater flexibility and have greater respect for "experience", incontrast to physicalist teaching on sexual ethics.

He insists that in the Church's ongoing"learning-teaching process", with its necessary expressions ofdissent, "the point of reference... must be the world" (207).

While accepting that God's Will must be"mediated" for us, he says that only "our personal religiousexperience of God...can test the authenticity of the mediation" (262).

5. A "Personalist" analysis —conditioned by history.

"The human person is the mostappropriate point of departure for elaborating on the meaning of morality ingeneral and... for dealing with specific moral questions" (63). But hisrelativism, his ignoring of Revelation, and his practical rejection of NaturalLaw (see below) make it impossible for him to clarify his "point ofdeparture": i.e. who or what is the human person. He says "inpersonalist morality the human person adequately considered is the criterionfor discovering whether an act is morally right" (64). But the analysisoffered of the human person "adequately considered" (66ss), isterribly inadequate. 1 Following Janssens, he gives these fundamentaldimensions: man is a "relational being", an "embodiedsubject", one "fundamentally equal to others but uniquelyoriginal" and an "historical being"(67). The application of thecriterion means that an action is morally right if it is beneficial to theperson considered adequately — in the first three dimensions. "ForJanssens this is an objective criterion since it is based on the constantdimensions of being human". But he then blandly adds: "But since itis a criterion about the human person as an historical being,it requires aregular review of the possibilities we have available to promote the humanperson so that we can determine whether they truly do so. Janssens recognizesthat the application of this criterion is not easy" (73). (Good forJanssens!). As is obvious, "historicity" dominates the moralcriterion and pulverizes its "objectivity".

The "new" view of theologyrejects unchanging principles and essences, and accepts that constantlychanging historical situations make truth and certainty very relative things: cf.pp. 30ss. He praises magisterial documents in which he sees "historicalconsciousness" (noticeable in the field of social teaching) and criticizesthose that lack it (noticeable above all in the field of sexual ethics)

6. Values, feeling, imagination and heart.

Moral knowledge is not"conceptual"; it is "evaluative knowledge", "feltknowledge", that comes from the heart (85). It is "the self-involvingknowledge which makes deciding and acting on behalf of what we value truly ourown. Without this knowledge we act merely by hearsay, by what we are told isright, rather than on the basis of what we have discovered to bevaluable"(87). cf. p. 109: "Only then ["when we have reachedevaluative knowledge"] is mortal sin possible".

"Only a small part of the moral lifeis influenced by the specific, conscious instruction which the church provideson moral issues. A considerably large part is influenced by the church's effecton the imagination". So, he concludes, the task of pastoral ministry — inteaching, etc. — is "to retell and reenact] the stories of faith in orderto fashion a Christian imagination" ... "By allowing our imaginationsto be transformed by these stories, we discover the truly redemptive responsesto life" (200). On p. 296ss, he returns to the importance of "theimaginative process to deepen the meaning of accepted (moral) norms and to testthe adequacy of their formulations". Cf. also pp. 71-72.

He attaches special importance to theliturgy for this task; but thinks the liturgical reform has so far failed. Amain reason is its present "excessive reliance on verbal forms ofcommunicating the mystery of divine love". Non-verbal artistic forms —dance, drama, etc. — "can make a strong appeal to the moralimagination". A second reason is its "sex-exclusive" malelanguage and structure (201).

See below, no. 15, on the "imaginativeshock" of Jesus' "Radical sayings".

7. Natural Law.

From Chs. 15 through 19, he relativises andin effect destroys the concept of the natural law. However, having rejected thereality, he then continues to use the term, so as to give apparent rationalauthority to his support of dissent on specific points, his criticism ofobedience, etc.

"The natural law is central to Romancatholic moral theology". The advantage of using it is that Church canpresent its teachings to all men, independently of belief; but in this he seesa corresponding disadvantage because it leads "to handing Christianmorality over to moral philosophy wherein religious beliefs do not really makea difference for moral claims" (220).

He draws a contrast between the order ofnature, "focused on the physical and biological structures given in natureas the source of morality", and the order of reason, "focused on thehuman capacity to discover in experience what befits human well-being".Affirming that "St. Thomas accepted both", he claims that vacillation— as to which of the two offers the right foundation for moral teaching —"has caused great confusion in Catholic moral thought" (223-224).

In effect he says that traditional Catholicmorality has, especially in sexual matters, put the order of nature("physicalism") over the order of reason (which, according to hispresentation, might also be called "Personalism": 226, par 2; end of232-223). Physicalism looks on nature "as a finished product prescribingGod's moral will and commanding a fixed moral response" (228). "Themodern worldview of contemporary morality" rejects this; "rather, itlooks on nature as evolving" (ib). At the same time as he thus destroysany objective notion of the natural law, he also destroys the instrument —reason — by which we can know it. This, I think, is the really dangerous threadthat runs especially through his presentation: claiming to have "reason"on his side, while in fact his reference point is not reason at all, but"experience"; "evolution", etc.

Logically, since human nature is inevolution, any "specific moral conclusions based on natural law... mustnecessarily be open to revision since more of the meaning of being human is yetto be discovered" (235-236). "Since "nature" is constantlychanging... change, revision, and development would be constitutive of thenatural moral law" (240). He insists that this is the view of"contemporary theology", which in consequence recognizes "theprovisional character of moral knowledge". At this stage it is perfectlyclear that the term "natural law", as he uses it, is emptied of anyreal content.

After two chapters in which he apparentlyaccepts "nature" and "natural law" (conditioned, however,by their changing and evolutionary character) his basic hostility to theconcept of "nature" appears quite clearly on p. 245. He describes"Gaudium et Spes" as "a landmark document for the shift from"nature" to "person" in an official Churchdocument"... It is an elementary philosophical error to oppose, as hedoes, "nature" and "person"; and to think that to focus onone, is necessarily to deemphasizethe other.2 He calmly adds the "nonsequitur" that the "shift" from nature to person"acknowledges ... what all persons have incommon"...

8. Freedom.

While he speaks o the dangers ofdeterminism, he would seem to over-stress the limitations on our freedom which"the behavioral sciences have clearly shown". Freedom means "toexpress oneself within one's own limits and according to one's ownpredispositions" (76). "The more we are able to become aware ofourselves and possess ourselves, including all the determining influences, themore we will experience ourselves as responsible for what we do and who webecome" (77).

We need "commitment to our ownintegrity and identity... resist[ing] those strong determining forces which areconstantly... fighting to make us someone else" (81). I show more freedomin doing what I want, than in doing what I ought... (82).

9. The Church and the Magisterium.

While he lists "church" (writtenthroughout in low case) among the sources of moral guidance, the Chapter on the"Church and moral Life" presents a protestant image of the Church:Jesus present in the believing and acting community (199ss).

He speaks of the church as the "bearerof moral tradition": bearer, rather than teacher... (202).

He acknowledges that the Magisterium is a"source of moral authority". However, omitting an exposition of thescriptural and ecclesiological ground for the special charism of theMagisterium,3 he immediately makesthe validity of magisterial teaching depend on the proper observation ofconsultative processes (154).

He considers "the teaching aspects ofthree different groups within the church: the faithful, theologians andpastoral ministers, and the hierarchy" He makes an elementary confusionbetween catechesis and Magisterium in insisting that "the real teachers inthe church are not the bishops but first the family and then thecatechists" (202).

Theologians: he assigns them the role ofinterpreters of the "givens of the apostolic faith", including"the ongoing formulations of the magisterium". He insists thetheologians, with their "somewhat independent role", must be allowedto carry on their critical function, "to test the given teaching...against scripture and tradition as well as to use critically the human sciencesin order to keep the teaching sound and applicable to contemporary living"(204).

Pastoral ministers: "bring theteaching... into contact with the specific lives of the people". They"must communicate the substance of scripture and teaching of the churchrealistically", being aware "also of what the particular context ofthe people is demanding" (204-5: emphasis added).

Hierarchy: Having assigned to thetheologians the mission of keeping the apostolic teaching sound, and ofinterpreting it,he says the responsibility of the hierarchy is to "affirm,protect and promote" this testimony of the apostles. He assigns to theHierarchy alone the task of designating "certain interpretations of theapostolic faith as the official interpretations of the Catholic Church whichare to guide pastoral practice. We speak of this as the function of the «authoritativemagisterium»(205). Not only is there no mention whatever of the scriptural andecclesiological basis to the function and charism of the Magisterium, but theimpression has already been left that it is the function of thetheologians to provide interpretations, other than those that are strictly"authoritative", so as "to keep the teaching sound"...

Whenever speaking of "dissent","pluralism", etc. he always allows that authority must exist and beexercised, so as to avoid chaos (cf. 205; 216); but his presentation comes downclearly on the side of individual conscience.

10. Dissent.

Of the 18 pages making up the chapter,"The Church and the Moral Life", more than 12 are devoted to"The Church as a Community of Moral Deliberation" (206-217; and of these,8 pages to "Dissent", with a strong apologia for "loyal"and "responsible" dissent (207ss).

He inaccurately equates the conditionalassent, permitted by the manuals, with dissent (208).

211: He invokes the tradition ofprobabilism to sustain his argument that a dissenting position can beresponsible if "supported by a considerable number of «experts» in thefield...However, determining who are the true experts in the field can be difficultto do, especially for the non-specialist". This precisely ignores thepoint that the Magisterium is the only «specialist» with the charism todetermine who is a true expert. It of course also ignores that probabilism hasits application as between views that the Church accepts or has not condemned.

On the same page, he passes over the thirdcriterion for responsible dissent laid down by the US Catholic Bishops in1968,which he had mentioned on p. 208: "the dissent must be such as not togive scandal".

"The aim of dissent is to try toconvince the magisterium that a present formulation of a teaching is inadequateor erroneous ... dissent can be a service to the church when it recognizes thatteaching is incomplete and inaccurate as it stands". The aim of responsibledissent is that "the formulation of the substance of the teaching [belrevised..." If this is not done, and the church, as a result, continues"promoting a truly defective teaching", this can lead "topossible disillusionment for people that the church is a reliable teacher"(214:emphasis added).

Dissent has a responsibility "toprotect the overall good of the church and the credibility of themagisterium" (213); as an example of the negative results that follow ifthis responsibility is not fulfilled, he instances how "the church'scredibility on matters of sexuality is already severely damaged" (thereason for this apparently being a lack of adequate dissent...).

The seriousness with which the"responsible" dissenter sees his mission emerges well in these pages.The trouble is that the criterion for knowing when some aspect of acceptedteaching is "inaccurate", "defective" or"erroneous", and in urgent need of "substantial" revisionapparently lies in the hands of the dissenter himself. So, in effect, thedissenter's being a responsible and autonomous critic of the magisterium is amatter of self-designation.

Earlier he had cited "HumanaeVitae" as an example of non-infallible teaching in moral matters, going onto say that conscience nevertheless cannot simply ignore it. Yet his conclusionis that, in such cases, the "presumption" in favour of theMagisterium must yield to clear contrary evidence, which would also include"the person's subjective capacity... to measure up to the specificbehavior prescribed by the teaching" (160).

11. Conscience.

He suggests that the Magisterium itselfcountenances two different criteria for relating law and morality: according toone, it is the natural law which is the norm for positive law; according to theother (based on par. 7 of Dignitatis Humanae), it is personal conscience(253-255).

He suggests that "rules" areopposed to freedom of conscience; and that accepting authority is a sign of animmature conscience (123-124).

Following John Glaser, he thinks that theCatholic who is sensitive to tradition, to authority, who confesses frequently,shows a warped conscience — a "Superego" (124ss.).

He follows T. O'Connell, "Principlefor a Catholic Morality", in the distinction of Conscience/1/2/3...Conscience/3 (which O'C. holds is infallible), "is the only sure guide foraction by a free and knowing person. Violating Concience/3 would be violatingour integrity" (135).

He explicitly defends the right of aCatholic couple, in certain circumstances, to use artificial birth control(160).

12. Moral Norms.

His distinction of "formal" and"material" moral norms closely follows that of T. O'Connell (e.g."Principles for a Catholic Morality", pp. 159ss.). Formal norms(O'Connell' "being-values" which are the only true moral value) arethe only absolute norms; they exist however only as "fundamentalvalues" [whose "specific expressions... inevitably belong toparticular cultures and historical epochs" (287). Material norms("doing-values" or premoral values) "relate to the sort ofactions we ought to perform". Not being absolute, they are governed by theprinciple of proportionalism. A (negative) material norm as, for instance,"the proscription of contraception", ought" to be interpreted ascontaining the implied qualifier... 'unless there is a proportionatereason'..." (290-291).

"The lack of proportionate reason isprecisely what makes acting contrary to a specific material norm... morallywrong"(292). From this it follows that if the proportionate reason exists,then it is not wrong to e.g. commit adultery, practice contraception orabortion, to lie..., etc. He approvingly quotes Edward Vacek (as speaking for,i.a., Josef Fuchs, Louis Janssens, Richard McCormick) that "one can neverbe theoretically certain that a given act is always wrong" (293). So, onecan never be sure that, not only adultery, but, say, bestiality, is always andin all circumstances wrong... In fact, at the start of the chapter (283), hehad allowed that absolute norms do exist, but had warned against the danger ofmaking all moral norms absolute.The danger seems to have been quite avoided.

He incorrectly states that if one acceptsthe principle of intrinsic or absolute evil, which "according to officialRoman Catholic teaching" applies to many actions, it becomes "thesole criterion for judging the morality of an action" (302)

Affirming that Jesus does not "providea moral system as such", he implies that his only specific moral commandis love (285-286).

13. Sin and Fundamental Option.

Sin is "the failure to be fullyresponsible" (90). The concept of social sin predominates.4 I do not find the sins of pride, lust,or gluttony, mentioned.

He defines original sin as "the humancondition of living in a world where we are influenced by more evil than thatwhich we do ourselves" (100; 106). It "makes actual and social sinpossible" (107).

A sin is mortal when "deliberatelycommitted with the intention of making a personal affront to God" (114).

In his presentation on pp. 109-110, the'serious matter' required as one of the conditions for mortal sin, loses allpractical importance beside the other two conditions: full consent andsufficient reflection.

In his fundamental option presentation ofmortal sin, an individual act of adultery (which is the example he gives) isnot really mortal unless it reflects a general direction of infidelity inmarried life (111-112). Pastors, etc. formed in the principles he enunciateshere would always answer "It depends",if asked by a personcontemplating adultery, abortion, or homosexual conduct, whether this would bea mortal sin or not (cf. 112-113).

14. Proportionalism.

He follows J. Fuchs in rejecting the notionof "intrinsic evil", as ignoring the proper analysis of actions intotheir "pre-moral" elements: from which, he says,derives "theinevitable ambiguity of human actions" which "mean that all humanactions contain some features which enhance our humanity and some featureswhich restrict it" (268-269).

Criticising the Principle of Double Effect(in common with Fuchs, etc.), he rejects the idea of actions that can be"good in themselves"; he goes on to say: "we... inevitably...commit some premoral/ontic evil to achieve good" (271), where what hepresumably should be saying is that, in doing good, we may commit or cause some(apparent or real) physical evil.

With the rest of the proportionalists, heconcludes —though he avoids putting it into such words— that the end justifiesthe means, or that evil can be done so that good may be achieved. Once theprinciple is admitted, it becomes impossible to maintain any convincing moralstand not only against e.g. contraception, abortion or voluntary euthanasia,but also against compulsory euthanasia, eugenic infanticide, laws penalizingcertain religious bodies because of their tenets (religious discrimination),racial discrimination, etc. His argument against a "utilitarianinterpretation of proportionality" is quite arbitrary, with no rationalsupport (272-273).

Applications of proportionalism: adulteryis considered "disproportionate" as a means of protecting the valueof sexuality (275).

His criterion for avoiding the danger ofsubjectivism inherent in proportionalism is reliance "on communaldiscernment... drawing upon the wisdom of past experience as it is embodied inthe community's standards" (278).

He speaks of proportionalism as a means"for determining the objective morality of human actions" (283),whereas, since the criteria on which the theory ultimately rests are allrelative, it is, at most, a means for determining the subjective morality ofactions. It offers no criterion for an objective moral judgment.

He does not really rebut the objection that"Proportionalism does not allow for specific universal norms"(278-279).

15. Residual Points noted.

— Ch. 12 "Scripture in MoralTheology":

Apart from the all-important commandment to"love", Scripture really lays down no God-given moral norms for ourconduct. The Ten Commandments are mentioned as an expression of God's Covenant,inviting our response; but the Commandments establish presumptions, rather thanrules (172-173).

The parable of Jesus stir our hearts, whilehis "Radical sayings" have the value of causing an "imaginativeshock" (therefore, he describes the saying about a lustful look beingequivalent to adultery committed in the heart, as a "hyperbolicmetaphor" (179).

Recourse to the Bible in the moral life ispossible, but "very difficult". But it remains necessary as "theprimary source for the stories and images which fashion a Christianimagination..." (181).

— Ch. 13 "Jesus andDiscipleship":

Perhaps the only significant thing here isthe brevity of the treatment of the Cross in the moral life: just a few lines,where its significance lies in how it "reveals the emptiness of alloppressive power" (196). Nowhere in the book, as far as I have noticed, isthe idea of self-denial — as a key to Christian moral growth — presented.

— Chapter 17: "Law andObedience":

Criticism of any practice of making positivelaws binding under sin, or of taking guidelines or ideals for moral behaviour,and "reducing" them to laws. Without the exercise of discernment,obedience is mere legalism which is oppressive and devoid of real virtue(262-263).

— For him morality cannot mean"fitting into the divine plan"; if it did, "then human freedomand responsibility would not really matter in the moral life". Rather"God's will gives a general orientation for our lives, but the specificsare left to us... the will of God is not so fixed from the beginning that itexcludes human involvement" (318-319). The essence, dignity and greatnessof the ideal of Christian moral living — the free response of each one of us toa personal vocation coming from God, and a particular will of God for each one— seem to escape him totally here.

C.B.(1990)

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